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Turkey is Working on Armenia While Russia, on Azerbaijan 
 
 
 
After the more than one-month long intense developments connected with actualizing Armenian-
Turkish relations, the talks with respect to shortly achieving success in this initiative now have 
decreased somewhat. Subsequently, on the road to collaboration, the enthusiasm changed into a 
cool calculation of the gains and losses of each side. In Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan’s “Turkish” 
course was criticized, as many viewed that this course provided the sole dividends to Turkey and 
risked Armenia’s interests. And different international assessments followed soon thereafter.    
 
For example, the renowned Marshall’s Foundation published an analytical paper entitled 
“Turkey and Armenia Talked, But Can They Walk Together?” The analysis states: “Serzh 
Sargsyan started a diplomatic reconsolidation game with the Turkish authorities and Levon Ter-
Petrosyan, the first president of Armenia, evaluated this game as a ‘great and unsubstantiated 
risk.’” And the analysts draw this general conclusion: Turkey should not shoulder the dark past 
of the Ottoman Empire while the Armenian diaspora should not think that it can jeopardize—
either today, or tomorrow—Armenia in order to close the historical account. That is to say, 
everyone perceives the depth of the contradictions that have accumulated in relations between 
the Armenian and Turkish peoples.  
 
It is unnecessary to speak about a quick solution to these contradictions. Apparently, this is why 
the first phase of the aforesaid enthusiasm ended so fast, but the political and diplomatic life in 
and around this region did not ease because of it. On the contrary, the passions boiled with a new 
vigor. It is an altogether different matter that the Turkish diplomatic initiatives have been 
replaced by American and Russian initiatives—and that the center of diplomatic activity has 
shifted to Azerbaijan. The visits of international diplomatic circles seem now to have been 
reduced to mere symbolism: Azerbaijan essentially has been offered free choice between the 
Russian and Western proposals. It is all too obvious that, in this case, meaningful diplomacy has 
been replaced by unconcealed bargaining on a variety of issues—and specifically on the issue of 
Mountainous Karabagh.    
 
Alarmed by the August events in Georgia, Azerbaijan now behaves in a very constrained 
manner. Furthermore, all hopes that the priority in the resolution of the Karabagh problem will 
pass to Turkey did not come to fruition. And it is not so easy to choose between the proposals 
made by the empires since their terms are extremely conflicting. Therefore when the US Deputy 
Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Azerbaijan on October 2, he stated that the United 
States was in favor of a conflict resolution that was based on territorial integrity and in 
consideration of other international precepts. But it is difficult to firmly assess the essence of this 
approach. The aforementioned statement gives Azerbaijan no guarantees that the problem will be 
resolved in accordance with its views.  
 
The issue is much more complex when it comes to Russia. There are growing rumors that Russia 
is holding private talks with Azerbaijan concerning Mountainous Karabagh. Even information 
was disseminated on a specific settlement plan by Russia. In general, this refers to the following 
steps: 1) The Armenian troops are relocated to the border of former NKAO while the Russian 
troops are deployed along the entire border; 2) The Lachin Corridor is handed over to Azerbaijan 
while the Russian troops secure transportation along the corridor; 3) The Armenian troops slowly 
are removed from Mountainous Karabagh and the latter’s police force is deployed there; and, 3) 
The status of Mountainous Karabagh is discussed at a convenient moment. It is evident by the 
diplomatic gestures and pronouncements made by the Russian officials that the talks concerning 
such negotiations are meaningful. 
 
Sergey Lavrov, the Russian minister of foreign affairs, visited Yerevan on October 3 and the 
Mountainous Karabagh issue was discussed. And in an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, on 
October 7, the Russian foreign minister said: “Armenia has great difficulties concerning 
communication with the outside world. It is of the Armenian people’s vital interest to unclog this 
situation as soon as possible. In fact, there are very few geographical and political avenues. Once 
the resolution of the Mountainous Karabagh problem becomes a reality, Turkey will be ready to 
help Armenia in establishing normal ties with the outside world and, naturally, this will occur 
when official and diplomatic relations between Ankara and Yerevan are established. But still two 
or three matters have remained unresolved—and this refers to the Lachin Corridor, in the first 
place.”      
 
As we can see, the Karabagh question is included in the broader issue of establishing Armenian-
Turkish relations and deblocking the border between these countries. In addition, the question 
with reference to the future status of the Lachin Corridor remains specifically unresolved. Hence, 
and without a doubt, Russia is occupied with a wide range of problems. Moreover, Russia also 
proposes its fairly specific vision of outlook for regional development. 
 
In fact, it is fairly difficult to reject the view that Russia offers Baku a “strategic deal” whose 
objective is to reach an agreement on the deployment of Russian troops in the Karabagh conflict 
zone. This is a deal which, as it seems, Azerbaijan is not yet ready to accept for several reasons. 
First and foremost, this matter concerns a wider geographical expanse for deploying troops to the 
region. At least there is some information that Azerbaijan doubts the expediency of deploying 
foreign troops to the Caspian Basin and considers this a “loss of independence in exchange for 
Karabagh.” But it is hard to doubt that the Karabagh settlement plan, which is proposed by 
Russia, is indeed a “hand-over” of Mountainous Karabagh to Azerbaijan. And such a deal is 
rather possible for the sake of deploying Russian troops at the aforementioned zone.     
 
Russia had intended to deploy its troops to the Karabagh conflict zone back when the ceasefire 
was established in 1994. At the time, the text of the Great Political Agreement was being 
prepared during the Moscow consultations between the experts from the conflicting sides. These 
several-month-long consultations were being held against the background of the ceasefire-
agreement signed, on 12 May 1994, by the Armenian and Azerbaijani ministers of defense and 
the commander of Mountainous Karabagh’s army. At that period Russia already had acquired 
the CSCE’s mandate to deploy its troops to the conflict zone. And this circumstance allowed the 
holding of trilateral consultations under its aegis and the CSCE Minsk Group’s activities 
temporarily were paralyzed. 
 
The talks did not bring any results until December 1994. Consequently no agreement was 
reached, since Mountainous Karabagh and Azerbaijan did not really want the Russian troops 
being deployed to the conflict zone. Furthermore, Russia’s relations became complicated with 
the CSCE, which insisted that a CSCE-Russia joint headquarters be formed at the conflict zone. 
As a result, during the CSCE’s Budapest summit Russia demanded from this organization to not 
interfere in the settlement process of conflicts, reasoning that the CSCE’s charter did not assume 
such tasks. And everything ended at the same summit, as the CSCE transformed into a 
peacemaking organization under the name “OSCE.” 
 
The talks returned to the Minsk Group format in late January 1995, but this time the OSCE and 
Russia appeared as the co-chairs of these talks. And it was also at this time that the groundwork 
was laid toward excluding the other countries—the Minsk Group members—from an immediate 
involvement in the Group’s activities. In addition, Russia’s plans toward deploying its contingent 
to Mountainous Karabagh failed and the ceasefire was secured, with a balance in the forces of 
the conflicting sides. 
 
As we can see, the Russian plans to deploy its troops to the Karabagh conflict zone have a long 
history. And, accordingly, it is quite rational that Russia now has revived these plans. It could 
not seriously think about such plans prior to the events in Georgia, but after the entry of its 
troops into Georgia—and the warming of Russian-Turkish relations—it seems the information 
on such plans have started to penetrate into the press. Official statements also might be made 
very soon. 
 
We must remember as well that in early July 2008 Russia and Azerbaijan already signed a 
declaration on strategic collaboration and this declaration included a point on carrying out a joint 
combat against separatism in the territories of these countries. Formally, this declaration creates 
the basis for the entry of Russian troops into Azerbaijan. The complicated international position 
of Azerbaijan and the abovementioned accordance seem to have motivated Russia. Ultimately, 
the prospect of a deblockage of the railway link between Armenia and Turkey is a strong trump 
card in Russia’s hands. And for such prospect Russia will attempt to demand a high price from 
the countries in the region.  But whether it will reach success is another issue, altogether. 
 
In any rate, no matter how dire Armenia’s situation may be, it cannot agree to the aforesaid 
settlement plan for the Karabagh problem. What is more, the price for the deblockage of railway 
in exchange for deploying Russian troops to eastern South Caucasus is too high for Turkey and 
Azerbaijan, alike. And here it is not even worth speaking about the position of the Western 
empires because they might tolerate the existence of Russian troops in Armenia but hardly, in 
Azerbaijan. Hence we need not wait for an easy implementation of Russia’s plans in the region. 
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